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Abstract  
 
In globalizing competitive markets knowledge exchange 
between business organizations requires incentive 
mechanisms to ensure tactical purposes while strategic 
purposes are subject to joint organization and other 
forms of contractual obligations. Where property of 
knowledge (e.g. patents and copyrights) and contract-
based knowledge exchange do not obtain network 
effectiveness because of prohibitive transaction costs in 
reducing uncertainty, we suggest a robust model for peer 
produced knowledge within a distributed setting. The 
peer produced knowledge exchange model relies upon a 
double loop knowledge conversion with symmetric 
incentives in a network since the production of actor 
specific knowledge makes any knowledge appropriation 
by use of property rights by the actors irrelevant. Without 
property rights in knowledge the actor network generates 
opportunity for incentive symmetry over a period of time. 
The model merges specific knowledge with knowledge 
from other actors into a decision support system specific 
for each actor in the network in recognition of actor role 
differences. The article suggests a set of 9 static and 5 
dynamic propositions for the model to maintain 
symmetric incentives between different actor networks. 
The model is proposed for business networks. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The centralized knowledge creation model promotes the 
idea of making knowledge available to the whole 
organization as the purpose of knowledge management 
(Nonaka 1994, Nonaka et al. 1994, Nonaka & Takeuchi 
1995, El Sawy & Bowles 1997, Favela 1997, Davenport 
& Klahr 1998). Knowledge management (KM) faces the 
challenge of how to ensure dynamic updating of codified 
as well as un-codified knowledge. The decision-making 
qualities of relevant and timely information for decision 
support come to the fore in the concept of information 
specificity, which stipulates the value of knowledge 
without complete property rights necessarily stipulated 
(Choudhury and Sampler 1997). The alternative to a 
centralized knowledge management model is a distributed 
knowledge management (DKM) model. The DKM model 
generates knowledge amongst decision-makers in 
interdependent businesses on a continuous basis. 
Moreover, the DKM model redistributes the outcome for 
a time efficient knowledge use amongst participants in 
networks of peer produced knowledge. We regard 
interdependent decision makers as actors, which either 
may be individuals or organizations. We find distributed 
knowledge management networks with peer production 
where the individuals with the best information available 
from other actors can perform tasks relevant to 
themselves in the network (Benkler 2002-3, p.7).  
Peer production is a third mode of allocation alongside 
markets and hierarchies (Coase 1937, Williamson 1975). 
Peer production provides an information gain over firms 
and markets, but only if the network develops 
mechanisms that avoid creating property rights to the 
knowledge and which ensures continuous relevance and 
value of the specific knowledge to their organization. 
“Peer production has an advantage over firms and 
markets because it allows larger groups of individuals to 
scour larger groups of resources in search of materials, 
projects, collaborations, and combinations than do firms 
or individuals who function in markets. This is because 
when production is organized on a market or firm model, 
transaction costs associated with property and contract 
limit the access of people to each other, to resources and 
to projects, but do not do so when it is organized on a 
peer production model” (Benkler 2002). 
A mechanism to sustain the “peer production” we find 
in a distributed knowledge management model if 
symmetric incentives for contributing quality knowledge 
is provided for by the set-up.  
Incentives are considered as any form of benefit which 
is of value to the respective actor. The benefits may be 
tangible or intangible, e.g. monetary payments or specific 
information. 
Symmetric incentives are regarded as “equally divided” 
benefits between the involved parties or actors. By 
“equally divided” benefits we understand that the benefits 
to the individual actor are perceived relevant and 
valuable. The benefits is not necessary of the same nature 
or content, but the “perceived amount” of benefits in the 
form of knowledge, information, data, products or 
services, etc., are considered comparable. Hence, the 
individual actors will have the impression that they give 
some and they gain some, and that the exchange provides 
them with “equal” benefits. 
Asymmetric incentives are incentives that are not 
“equally” divided, meaning that one actor may conduct 
certain activities and provide an other actor with relevant 
and specific information, but does not receive an “equal” 
amount of benefits. 
If asymmetry prevails, peer production turns into 
benefits for one actor rather than for all disrupting 
participatory and contributive justice. This happens if 
property right in peer-produced knowledge is invoked. 
Asymmetry would also apply if any single actor could 
“defect” contributing to the peer production and yet reap 
benefits. Trust in the distributed knowledge network 
would fade (Adler 2001).  
Generally, if the cost of organizing knowledge 
acquisition on peer basis is lower than the cost of using 
the market, and the cost of peering is lower than the cost 
of hierarchical organization, then peer production will 
emerge (Benkler 2002). 
We may note that knowledge exchange facilitated by 
information and communication technologies (ICT) 
across space and time are much cheaper and more 
efficient than ever before, which permits the coordination 
of distributed knowledge and exploitation of its 
specificity for production and distribution of services and 
products. 
Symmetry in opportunities to exploit knowledge and 
time specificity ensures continuous knowledge creation in 
a network. Knowledge creation in this article means 
knowledge specificity irrespective of whether knowledge 
is tacit or explicit (Choudhury & Sampler 1997).  
The centralized KM model consists in a single loop 
conversion, i.e. from individual, knowledge specificity 
into organizational, collective knowledge made available 
to all individuals where each individual ad hoc converts 
the global knowledge into decision support. The 
distributed KM model, see e.g. figure 2, requires a double 
loop conversion by adding to the centralized model the 
conversion of organizational, collective knowledge into 
knowledge specificity taking responsibility for making 
knowledge creation available for decision support. The 
latter process also makes for the difference between a 
centralized KM system that is passive in regard to 
decision making and an active decision support system 
that is distributed.  
The relevance of the distributed model complements the 
incentive problems of knowledge sharing in the supply 
chain literature. Applications of the model can be found 
in supply network decision support systems with 
symmetric incentives for information sharing and 
knowledge creation.  
The research objective of this paper is to add to the 
existing knowledge base of distributed knowledge 
management by establishing a set of propositions with 
regard to static and dynamic aspects of robustness of a 
distributed knowledge management model. 
Hence, the research questions becomes: What are 
necessary conditions for establishing and maintaining 
robustness of a distributed knowledge management 
model. 
The research method relies mainly on literature studies 
and reflections steaming from the authors training in 
social science, economics and engineering. The analysis 
of the distributed knowledge management model relies 
upon an actor network perspective as this is responsive 
towards relations within and between business networks. 
In the following section the DKM model is positioned 
in the literature of knowledge management in order to 
verify the relevance of this research contribution. 
Consecutively, the DKM model is presented as a basis for 
the discussion of robustness. 
 
2. The Evolution of Knowledge Management 
 
The first knowledge management models focused on 
knowledge acquisition issues much along the lines of AI 
research a decade before (Constant et al. 1994). Incentive 
schemes moved to the fore as knowledge management 
became a high-priority management objective in major 
consultancies. The management challenge in knowledge 
intensive businesses became how to make team members 
in knowledge creation also contribute in sharing business 
methodologies efficiently to provide for the needs of 
clients. This issue was captured in the classic article of 
Nonaka from 1994 on organizational knowledge creation. 
In recent years, competition has increasingly ruled out 
this knowledge management strategy and at the same time 
brought to the attention of management the opportunities 
for a focused use of information technologies for 
knowledge acquisition and dissemination within the 
organization (Ciborra & Andreu 1996, Borghoff 1997, 
Davenport & Prusak 1998).  
The following models moved on to offer a knowledge 
repository much inspired by enterprise resource planning 
models and the concept of centralized, corporate 
databases. In these models we find information quality 
issues along with best practice objectives that take 
knowledge across functional entities, between divisions 
or subsidiaries to make knowledge an organizational asset 
(Davenport & Klahr 1998). Disseminating knowledge 
was a matter of information retrieval and acquisition by 
each user as (s)he saw fit. Little or no decision support 
was offered from these repositories. What they offered 
were results of previous learning that only could be 
accessed if known to exist. “Much of the knowledge 
management movement in business schools and punditry 
since the mid-1990s was concerned with mitigating the 
looseness of managerial hierarchy as an information 
processing mechanism. Mitigating this lossiness is the 
primary job of CIOs.” (Benkler 2002-3, p.42). 
A third kind of models moved on to widen the scope of 
knowledge management by including business partners in 
a broader network of knowledge exchange. In particular 
manufacturing and service suppliers in customer support 
knowledge took advantage of the Internet in moving 
knowledge beyond organizational boundaries (El Sawy & 
Bowles 1997, Hagel & Rayport 1997). The supply chain 
attracted attention with its scope for increase of overall 
efficiency. The linear model of a knowledge flow of the 
demands of customers to dealers and distributors did not 
transform into value-added knowledge before considering 
the advantage from using the World Wide Web using rich 
information representations.  
The model of supply chain management relates a 
significant share of all trade to opportunities of 
knowledge management for efficiency purposes thus 
representing a significant part of all business models. The 
supply chain network has been shown to benefit from 
information technology in the order fulfillment process 
(Strader et al. 1998). Unlike previous often hypothetical 
discussions of virtual organizations, the supply chain 
network decision support system provides a robust 
knowledge based structure where the knowledge 
exchange enhances the performance efficiency of all 
participating in the network.  
The model we will present differs in a significant aspect 
from other models catering only for knowledge sharing 
discarding the specific nature of network business 
relations but stressing the decision support capability 
(Sridhar 1998). We argue that exchange of peer produced 
knowledge in a network will generate performance 
advantages to the participants not achieved by contractual 
knowledge exchange. Further, we suggest that advantages 
may prevail if peer produced knowledge sustain 
symmetry of incentives, which means that the actors are 
equally positioned to apply that for production of 
knowledge specificity. 
 
3. Actor Network Distributed Knowledge 
Management 
 
The following table rephrases the insights from the 
literature review above into tasks of the process owner, 
classified by the nature of the issues that the process 
owner needs to tackle 
The raison d’être of network distributed knowledge 
management resides in actor network role differentiation 
(Callon 1991, Hull et al 1999). Originating in innovation 
studies the actor network concept now permeates into the 
economics and sociology of organizing entities 
(‘intermediaries’) and actors that are defined through their 
relationships. The nature of flows of knowledge (the 
‘intermediaries’) between actors in computer-based 
networks takes on a dimension of symmetric incentives 
not otherwise found. In traditional economic analysis 
interdependencies across several market boundaries go 
unaccounted, an exception is Porter’s clusters (1990, 
1998a, 1998b), and in sociology these are abstracted into 
institutional categories in neglect of actors. Actor network 
theory allows for both autonomy and interdependence of 
actors in networks constructed by that which is 
exchanged, the intermediary, here specific knowledge 
taking account of each actor’s specific role in the 
network.  
In a business value chain the division of labor allocates 
different tasks for each actor. These tasks require specific 
and global knowledge in varying combinations for their 
completion. The resource-based view of the firm argues 
that for each actor compared to others in the same market 
the one succeeding the best in the value chain holds 
somewhat unique resources. The resource differential also 
explains the positioning in the value chain by reference to 
rents and quasi-rents from these resources (Wernerfelt 
1984, Milgrom and Roberts 1992, Foss 1997). The 
information associated with the resource-based view 
exhibits the characteristics of asset specificity from the 
point of view of transaction cost economics (Williamson 
1985, 1986, 1994). In this section this specificity is 
examined in more detail.  
 
3.1 Information Specificity  
 
Information specificity is defined as "the extent to 
which the value of information is restricted to its use 
and/or acquisition by specific individuals or during 
specific time periods" (Choudhury and Sampler 1997:29). 
Information specificity with regard to environmental 
scanning reflects a drive for timely and relevant 
information. Generally, information specificity is in two 
forms, knowledge and time specificity. Knowledge 
specificity refers to either scientific or technical 
knowledge or “knowledge of context, or knowledge of 
particular circumstances of time and place” (Choudhury 
and Sampler 1997:30). If acquiring the information 
presupposes special training and insights, the information 
is high in knowledge specificity in acquisition. The same 
holds for specificity in use, which often follows 
specificity in acquisition (Huber 1982). Knowledge 
specificity may reside in different people or units in an 
organization, called intra organizational knowledge 
specificity. Inter organizational knowledge specificity 
applies “if the knowledge required to interpret the 
information is restricted to members of a single 
organization.”(op.cit.32) In this paper the inter 
organizational knowledge specificity in a network 
economy refers to the existence of knowledge that is 
specific to each single organization in the network 
reflecting that division of labor follows from a high 
degree of specialization.  
Time specificity can be found in the dictum that the 
right information at the right place in the right time 
prevails over all other information. Time specificity in use 
reflects a fast loss of value if the information is not used 
immediately, whereas the time specificity in acquisition 
refers to an event like nature of information, an example 
is that the registration of the size of an earthquake must 
take place at the time of the quake. This example also 
conveys that specificity in use may not follow from 
specificity in acquisition. 
 
Table 1: The specificity of information. 
Source: Choudhury and Sampler 1997:29. 
 
The information time specificity argument can be 
extended to business in general due to the proliferation of 
time-based competition (Stalk and Hout 1990, Wang and 
Barron 1997). Competition leaves few without a sting 
from time pressures that are translated into information 
requirements equally time sensitive. In this sense much 
information acquires time specificity that if put aside 
devalues or makes the information irrelevant.  
Timeliness no longer only resides with products like 
newspapers, flight tickets, tomatoes or sophisticated 
electronic products. Since timeliness is associated with 
business in general the time specificity of information 
assets achieves a much wider relevance than that of a 
particular product or service characteristic. Further, 
shorter product lifecycles due to innovation speed up and 
due to customizations result in frequent change in product 
varieties which makes necessary a careful product-
customer tracking system demanding a management 
response alike the timeliness claim.  
Knowledge specificity traditionally plays a significant 
role in strategic technology collaboration for product 
development (Badaracco 1991). As more technologies 
become systemic the knowledge interdependencies 
increase in use while relying upon knowledge specificity 
in acquisition (Teece 1987, Chesbrough and Teece 1996). 
In networks the knowledge specificity is a defining 
characteristic whether explained by the transaction cost 
economics of relational contracting due to asset 
specificity or explained by beneficial (knowledge) co-
operation (Johanson and Mattson 1987). Knowledge 
specificity carries over into knowledge management 
issues of identification, storage and use.  
 
3.2 The Actor Network Distributed Knowledge 
Management Model  
 
The concept ‘distributed’ refers to an organization in 
which activities are located to those locations or entities 
where it is best performed, determined for example by 
skills, costs or resources (Galbraith and Lawler 1993). In 
our context, distributed normally also refers to 
independent organizations (companies) performing each 
their value-added activities.  
In an actor network distributed model of knowledge 
management the acquisition of knowledge will not reside 
only within a single organization. The inter-
 Time specificity Knowledge 
specificity 
Specificity  
in 
acquisition 
Information that must 
be acquired 
immediately, or very 
shortly, after it first 
originates or becomes 
available 
Information that 
can be acquired 
only by someone 
with the required 
specific knowledge 
Specificity  
in use 
Information that 
decreases in value 
unless used 
immediately, or very 
shortly, after it becomes 
available 
Information that 
can be effectively 
used only by 
someone with the 
required specific 
knowledge 
organizational knowledge specificity reflects the 
differences in specialization and position in the network, 
for instance a supply chain. In any organization external 
business partners are a source of important business 
information. Therefore it remains a target in the 
establishment of a repository to convert various partner-
competitor systems into partnership systems sharing 
relevant and timely information about the significant 
environment of the company. Facing increasing 
competition in e.g. customer response time organizations 
are looking for tools to up-date the repository at a 
continuous basis, when thresholds are reached that elicits 
signals calling for attention. The more frequent that 
threshold information enters into daily routines the more 
decision support is derived. The knowledge specificity of 
a partner may be merged with that of another that 
converts the information into new specific knowledge. 
This knowledge fed back to the contributing partners’ 
local applications generates opportunity of specific 
knowledge.  
If we merge these aspects of information processing in 
an inclusive environment we end up with a system 
holding distributed knowledge repositories at the same 
time as showing decision support qualities due to 
information timeliness and relevancy to the network 
actors. The network makes partners’ time specific 
knowledge available for processing along with the actor’s 
own specific knowledge.  
An example of the distributed knowledge management 
approach is the EUREKA case. Peer production - 
proprietary, not commons-based - as first used to solve 
the imperfection of hierarchical organization in Xerox’s 
Eureka system organizing questions from and answers to 
field technicians about failures of photocopiers (Bobrow, 
et al). In reaction to performance failure the firm created a 
decentralized communications system for technicians to 
post questions, a peer-reviewed system for technicians to 
answer questions, and a database library of past questions 
and answers available to technicians who confront new 
problems.  
“Eureka flipped the traditional hierarchical conception 
of knowledge in a machine as codified by engineers and 
implemented by instruction following technicians. The 
knowledge content of the machine was now understood to 
be something that is incomplete when it leaves the design 
board, and is completed over the life of the machines by 
technicians who share questions and solutions on a peer-
review, volunteer model.” (Benkler 2002-3, p.43). 
Beneath, find the decision process of each actor in the 
network and the distributed, specific knowledge. The 
figure represents a succession of nested knowledge 
creations in a distributed environment (Riempp and 
Nastansky 1997). Each actor conducts independent, 
separate information management allowing for message 
objects for the exchange of specific knowledge items in 
the network.  
Figure 1 illustrates two triangles, each presenting an 
exchange relation of Knowledge, Information, and Data 
(KID) where data is a low level descriptor, information an 
application descriptor, and knowledge an actor network 
descriptor. For each actor, a number of internal activities 
are shown. The activities engaged in a KID relation are 
highlighted in order to emphasize the external relation. 
Activities engaged in more than one KID exchange 
relation are multi-purpose activities. The activities may 
represent a unit of a business process. A unit may have 
different levels of abstraction depending on the purpose 
being served, the viewpoint and the context of the 
external relation, e.g. a sub business process, a general 
task, or a detailed sub-task. 
 
 
Figure 1: Information specificity of actor network 
distributed knowledge management – multi-purpose 
activities. 
Note: The quadrants represent activities where the 
small quadrants represent single purpose activities and the 
larger quadrant represents a multi purpose activity. A 
circle represents an organization or an individual. The 
chain of activities within a circle represents a simplified 
business process in an organization, and the lines 
connecting the activities are knowledge, information and 
data (KID) exchange relations. The legs of the triangles 
are KID exchange relations between logically related 
activities, whereas the triangle itself represents a 
distributed knowledge network.  
 
In figure 2 below the proposed model of a supply 
network decision support system based upon well-defined 
knowledge repositories is found.  
Beneath in table 2, we have outlined a simplified 
business structure in which the company exchanges 
information with a representative dealer and an end-user 
(customer) of its product or service. To analyze the nature 
of the relationships we present the relationship in more 
detail. This is obtained if we consider a manufacturing 
company and the dealer as a service company whereas the 
end-user may be in any kind of trade. The determination 
of actors is meant as illustration of the model that is 
considered to be generally relevant in networks. For 
details see Larsen et al. (1999), Larsen & Pedersen 
(2001), Pedersen & Larsen (2001), and Larsen & 
Pedersen (2003).  
In the matrix below only knowledge regarding product 
maintenance and replacement is entered whereas business 
information such as prices, quotes, orders, and payments, 
all have been disregarded since that are standard contract 
information exchange in all businesses. In this example 
the business information interchange does not call upon a 
decision support model though in fact such a model 
alongside the one beneath may be relevant, too. 
 
To:  
From: 
Producer Dealer End user 
 
Producer 
Internal 
knowledge 
handling  
Product 
services 
knowledge 
Stock mix 
according to 
PSM 
Self service 
manuals  
On line 
advice 
End-user 
community 
 
Dealer 
State of 
stock mix  
Crisis 
management 
spare parts 
stock 
Internal 
knowledge 
handling 
Allocated 
(reserved) 
spare parts in 
stock 
Maintenance 
services  
 
End user 
Hours of 
product use 
FAQs 
revealing 
usage 
problems 
Time 
critical 
services 
Maintenance 
support 
Replacement 
support 
Product 
support 
Internal 
knowledge 
handling 
Table 2: A distributed knowledge management model. 
 
The knowledge management approach stresses source 
of knowledge and needs for sharing. In this model, 
sharing is given by the nature of the relationships between 
the three actors of a supply network. They are truly 
interdependent if all parties hold specific information. 
That is the case if the dealer’s database on customers also 
make them know the propensities for their customers to 
repair rather than replace parts and components, the 
propensity to cater for risk amongst their customers, all 
adding up to a knowledge of the immediate expected 
demand for services and spare parts. At the same time the 
dealers exploit this knowledge not in terms of a large 
amount of data but in terms of consolidated data, i.e. the 
demand for allocated (reserved) stock and for a crisis 
managing stock to cope with unexpected demand.  
The producer on the other hand receives information 
from end-users’ hours of use and their need for use of 
repair manuals and instructions, the community facility 
giving access to attitudes as well as actual problems of 
operating the product of the producer. The producer 
learns from his end-users what becomes valuable 
knowledge when redesigning the product, and changing 
components or materials used in the product.  
Further, the end-user is in the position to offer 
information not only to the producer but also in terms of 
actual behavior concerning their needs for replacements, 
repair-sets, and other relevant products and services to 
their dealer. Hence, on a continuous basis the dealer 
receives information about end-users needs and 
propensities to buy or repair converting this knowledge 
into privileged information according to a local model.  
Dealers receive general information on product life and 
services requirements according to continuously 
generated data models from the producer. This 
information is merged with the dealer’s knowledge of his 
customer base. The merged knowledge comes out as 
privileged dealer knowledge useful for the planning of his 
stock and supplementary services to meet the immediate 
needs of his market.  
The three actors of the supply network all hold 
privileged knowledge that, offered as continuous data to 
the other actors, make the aggregate information emerge 
as new specific knowledge while being proper as decision 
support for each actor in his particular circumstances. The 
faster the information exchange cycle, the more the 
quality of relevance is supplemented with the one of 
timeliness adding up to a new category, i.e. the distributed 
knowledge decision support.  
 
 
Figure 2. The actor network distributed knowledge 
management model.  
 
Only by abandoning the dualistic model where the firm 
confronts an anonymous market does the nature of 
business-to-business and business-to-consumer relations 
emerge as complex interdependent relationships, i.e. the 
ground for evolving strategic knowledge management 
options. The firm has to be perceived in a heterogeneous, 
structured rather than a homogenous, environment where 
identified competitors and customers represent 
opportunities but also challenges to the firm (Anderson et 
al. 1997). The co-existence of customer relations, 
business partners and relationships, and networks for 
distributed knowledge management coalesce into what 
Venkatraman and Henderson (1998) have named the 
“architecture for virtual organizing” stressing that these 
are strategic characteristics applicable to every 
organization.  
The table below presents a number of general examples 
from various industries of actors of distributed knowledge 
management networks and their primary knowledge 
exchange, i.e. the ‘intermediaries’ that trigger the actor 
network. 
 
Industry Actor A Actor B 
 
Actor C Network 
Inter-
mediary 
Manu-
facturing 
Producer 
of 
fertilizer 
sprayers 
Dealers of 
sprayers 
and spare 
parts 
Farmers Product 
consump-tion 
data 
Profes-
sional 
Service 
Profes-
sional 
service 
provider 
Interme-
diary 
Client Project 
specific 
knowledge 
(Financin
g partner) 
Health 
Care 
Medical 
Service 
Organiza-
tion 
Doctors Patients Patient 
medical 
history and 
treatment 
record 
Tele 
commu-
nication 
National 
Organiza-
tion 
Supplier Customer 
(e.g. Public 
Telecom-
munica-
tions 
Operator) 
Information 
and commu-
nication 
system 
specifica-
tions 
Table 3: Examples of distributed knowledge 
management actor networks. 
 
The ‘intermediary’ triggers each actor’s information 
specific contribution and makes up for the nature of 
economizing in the actor network. The efficiency 
improvement for actor A would normally differ from the 
kind of efficiency improvement achieved by B, and so 
forth. In the manufacturing case actor A achieves product 
state information economizing on product improvements 
and maintenance, whereas actor B limits capital 
expenditures on stock, and actor C decreases maintenance 
time and its costs. Equally different competitive 
advantages coexist in the other actor networks.  
Compared to a linear model of business processes (e.g. 
Porter 1985) the overall efficiency of the actor network 
distributed knowledge model is superior because it 
provides an information feedback mechanism to the value 
chain enhancing the information base of each production 
function. In a competitive marketplace knowledge 
exchange only takes place if markets exist for each 
exchange, and markets exists only if property rights are 
defined (Arrow 1974, Coase 1992). Markets are hard to 
bring about for specific knowledge as information good 
with uncertain value to the procurer, a very limited 
market potential and with relevance for a very limited 
period of time, unless provided as a service and then for a 
period of time in case of which procurer uncertainty 
increases. Thus, markets in most cases will not come into 
existence for specific knowledge exchange in networks.  
Peer knowledge cannot be appropriated completely 
when associated with a common knowledge domain, as is 
the case of professions. Yet, in all professions the ability 
to synthesize peer knowledge with local, specific 
knowledge distinguishes the excellent from the mediocre 
practitioner (Schon 1983).  
The actor network model of distributed knowledge is 
based upon peer knowledge coming into existence on the 
explicit premise that no property rights can be established 
due to prohibitive transaction costs and to a break down 
of incentives if any actor appropriate benefits on behalf of 
others (Benkler 2002-3).  
The actors are renumerated by each their own product 
though each of these, in each their way, has benefited 
from peer knowledge interchange.  
 
4. Model Robustness  
 
This section provides a discussion of the robustness of the 
DKM Model. Robustness refers to how changes in the 
actor network influence the properties of the model.  
A decision support system generates decisions or 
decision suggestions for the user. The double conversion 
loop DKM model converts distributed knowledge into 
multi-decision making suggestions or choices for the 
different actors in the network creating a symmetric 
incentive structure. An actor network peer production of 
knowledge that are beneficial for each actor creates an 
equilibrium of incentives. If the equilibrium is up-set due 
to diminishing differentiation in peer produced 
knowledge over a period, then incentives for maintaining 
the knowledge production erodes. If a single actor 
(minor) out of a large number of actors looses interest in 
the peer production the equilibrium last, but if major 
actors (and numbers) defect from peer production then 
peer knowledge is bound to appear less trustworthy and 
the equilibrium will break-down.  
These features make the double conversion actor 
network knowledge model more robust than a single 
conversion model that only relies upon a separation 
between acquiring and using information in a decision 
context disregarding peer knowledge production.  
Which conditions are required to create and maintain 
peer production? 
The analysis of peer production of knowledge assumes 
lower information opportunity costs than markets and 
hierarchies for knowledge exchange. If peer production 
breaks down then there is higher costs involved if 
rebuilding takes place using either prices or contracts as 
basis for exchange. Therefore actors have incentives to 
maintain the peer production as far as possible. The 
competitive balance between the organizations depends 
upon each actor's capability and capacity to transform 
peer produced into specific knowledge.  
“The hypothesis is that rich information exchange 
among large sets of agents free to communicate and use 
existing information resources cheaply will create 
sufficiently substantial information gains of this sort … to 
overcome the added information exchange costs 
necessary to overcome the absence of pricing and 
managerial direction, and the added coordination costs 
created by the lack of property and contract as 
institutional bases for structuring coordination (Benkler, 
2002-3, p. 43).  
Peer production of knowledge does not exclude 
contractual exchange of codified knowledge (as in 
patents, copyright,) but complement these formal types of 
knowledge. Formal knowledge is protected (more or less 
effectively) against undue appropriation. Peer produced 
knowledge would be curtailed if it was appropriated as a 
private good. In our model peer produced knowledge is 
merged with specific knowledge before acquiring 
economic value for the appropriator.  
A distributed knowledge actor network argues that 
development of local knowledge specificity requires 
access to peer produced knowledge. If the latter is lacking 
risk of innovation failure increases. We base this 
proposition on empirical findings showing no core 
competence structure amongst large companies measured 
by the rod of required product portfolio competences. 
Instead we find “distributed competences” relating 
technological competence to a wider environment. Peer 
produced knowledge feeds the distributed competence 
structure and not product specific knowledge 
(Grandstrand et al 1997). Innovation flows from 
distributed competence management appeared stronger 
than from product focused competence structures.    
Knowledge is perceived as a tool instead of the classic 
“message-object” model from Shannon-Weaver in studies 
of distributed teams using metaphors of knowledge, 
differentiating embedded from mobile knowledge like in 
our distinction between specific knowledge (embedded) 
and peer produced knowledge (mobile) (Kanfer et al 
2000).  
How do we achieve distributed knowledge management 
in organizations focused on product specific (embedded) 
knowledge? Given a distributed knowledge actor network 
has come about, what are the chances that it will last?  
In the following sections the static and dynamic aspects 
of the actor network model of distributed knowledge is 
analyzed.  
 
4.1 Static aspects of the DKM Model 
 
In the following paragraphs we list propositions on the 
robustness of the actor network distributed knowledge 
model. Each proposition should be considered a research 
issue to address in the future.  
(Proposition 1) Information capability of the network 
actors matches each other if peer knowledge required of 
one would meet the requirements of another. The 
specificity rests upon the business of the actors’s position 
in the network and not upon the peer knowledge. A 
network may rest its business case upon time specificity 
in repair and maintenance due to narrow time windows of 
operations as in the airlines flight RMS (replacement-
maintenance-service) industry. Only actors acting on 
knowledge timeliness would fit in this network. How do 
network actors establish that partners have requisite 
information capability?  
(Proposition 2) Allocation flexibility. A distributed 
knowledge network with transactions that trigger 
decisions designed to maximize the total revenue of the 
network is viable if revenue is distributed proportional to 
the investment asset specificity of the actors (Teece 
1987). Network economies are achieved on the condition 
of complementary actor incentives. Systems inherent 
mismatch would allow for variations in knowledge or 
time specificity that generally is of complementary nature 
but would disrupt the network if of competing nature. 
How do network actors obtain requisite complementarity 
in peer knowledge?  
(Proposition 3) Incentives for knowledge creation 
reside in each actor. The network actors do not have to 
allocate a knowledge repository in a single network node 
thus the distributed knowledge model design is non-
hierarchical and non-centralized. The distributed 
knowledge model leaves scope for the design of single as 
well multi-node repositories according to network 
characteristics and peer knowledge. An unequal 
development in knowledge creation jeopardizes incentive 
compatibility across the actor network. When will 
knowledge network effects align and when misalign actor 
incentives?  
(Proposition 4) Trust in network actors looms high on 
the agenda in distributed knowledge management for the 
reason of non-recoverable specific assets invested in the 
network cooperation. The level of investment specificity 
determines the degree of lock-in. Networks with highly 
co-specialized assets reflect a higher level of trust than 
networks struggling to balance the risks and the benefits 
amongst the participants (Teece 1987). Generally, trust is 
stronger if strings and formalities upon network 
participants’ peer production of knowledge are informal. 
Maintaining peer production without evaluation of its 
relevance to knowledge specificity allows for detraction 
of knowledge creation. How does the organization create 
yardsticks for peer knowledge engagement?  
(Proposition 5) Trust in the network systems represents 
trust in a network as a collective endeavor or a 
community where laggards and other deviations trigger 
control behavior (Bobrow et al. 2003). Monitoring the 
network actors may jeopardize the objective, viz. to 
install trust in the common system. Which yardsticks for 
knowledge assessment are compatible with trust building 
in actor networks?  
(Proposition 6) Incentive compatibility or congruency 
determines the viability of a distributed knowledge actor 
network. If incentive compatibility prevails, the network 
achieves robustness against external shocks, and the 
participants themselves raise voice if peers decline to 
participate or if low quality knowledge is offered. If a 
network is challenged by another - competing – actor-
network, a new knowledge dynamic results (see below). 
Will competing actor-networks create network closure or 
stimulate peer knowledge production acting as an 
incentive? 
(Proposition 7) Stability of knowledge specificity. 
Asymmetric knowledge lifecycles due to different 
information value depreciation schemes for specific 
knowledge would jeopardize the incentives for peer 
knowledge creation. Knowledge specificity creation 
should be based on investments balanced by benefits. 
Depreciation schemes should probably not be equal 
across different domains of knowledge. How will domain 
differences in knowledge specificity be properly 
acknowledged in an organization? If only seen in regard 
to product performance (financial), peer knowledge 
production risk becomes undervalued to the detriment of 
knowledge specificity. How is the interdependency 
between peer knowledge and specificity established in an 
actor-network? 
(Proposition 8) The higher the information capability of 
an actor, the more marginal is the investment in 
distributed knowledge management if knowledge 
specificity rests upon standards. Yet, knowledge 
specificity may be a competitive advantage factor. If the 
knowledge specificity diminishes then so does the 
competitive advantage. The disadvantage from loss of 
specificity in knowledge may be balanced by time 
specificity or another asset specificity derived from the 
knowledge exchange in the network. That would be the 
case if one asset attribute, e.g. the time sensitivity, 
remains intact after loss of knowledge specificity in other 
regards though  leaving a lower entry barrier for 
competitors to the network. Can knowledge specificity 
adapt to new environmental conditions changing one or 
more attributes? 
(Proposition 9) Lock-in has to be considered in all actor 
networks where the actors have invested to create 
transaction specific advantages from knowledge 
specificity. Contracts are rarely considered an assurance 
against losses in actor networks due to the dynamics of 
the peer production relationships. A network with co-
specialized assets raises interdependence at the cost of the 
freedom to opt out. The interdependency between peer 
knowledge and specificity determines the degree of lock-
in, the stronger the peer production the less likely is a 
lock-in and the stronger the knowledge specificity the 
more likely it is conditioned by asset specificity.  
 
4.2 Dynamic aspects of the DKM Model 
 
(Proposition 2-1) Knowledge stability over its lifecycle is 
a point reflecting unequal diminishing value. Network 
actors may experience that knowledge asset specificity 
deteriorate before that of other networks. For these actors 
the value of the network diminishes but long-term 
benefits have to be evaluated before decision making 
about exit from peer production of knowledge. (See also 
prop. 7.) 
(Proposition 2-2) Incentive instability reflects that 
knowledge creation in actor networks is faster than if 
conducted in isolation but at the risk of incentive changes 
that polarize the participants. The sensitivity in 
knowledge specificity may be countered by the peer 
knowledge perceived value for the actor network making 
the network resistant to changes due to changes in 
knowledge specificity. For instance in a supply chain 
network, robustness derives from combinations of 
knowledge and time specificity that may uphold unevenly 
as structure in the final demand changes. Yet, a period of 
adaptation to the new market conditions may be 
acceptable to the actors.  
(Proposition 2-3) Information system self-
control/autonomy will contribute to a steady state model 
where knowledge accuracy and validity enhance decision-
making powers of the actors. The advantages anyone 
derives at any time from the distributed knowledge 
system come from previous quality of knowledge inputs. 
If these inputs deteriorate so will the decisions that rely 
upon that knowledge.  
(Proposition 2-4) Horizontal market dynamic. 
Horizontal competing distributed knowledge systems 
invite opportunism of network actors. If competing 
networks appear, the peer knowledge production risks 
being corrupted so the decision-making strength of the 
actors in the network deteriorates.  
(Proposition 2-5) Vertical market dynamics. If value-
adding competitors exploit information as proxies for 
supplementary services and complementary products not 
offered in the original network that invites the participants 
to dump previous investments. The potential exit of actors 
or the opportunistic behavior of those left threatens the 
viability of the network. In the long term the network may 
not be competitive but will be abandoned.  
The dynamic aspects of distributed knowledge models 
reflect contingencies of actor-networks much more than 
do knowledge network’s interdependency models 
(Alstyne 1997).  
These propositions on the DKM model are not 
preemptive but capture some of the challenging issues 
that these actor-networks face and thus what research 
should be about in this field. Though informed by 
behavioral theory knowledge specificity requires more 
analytic tools including information models to capture its 
complex dynamics.  
 
5. Conclusion and Perspectives 
 
The distributed knowledge model relies upon knowledge 
specific decision support with symmetric incentives for 
peer production of knowledge. The model merges specific 
knowledge with peer knowledge from an actor-network 
for decision support specific for each actor in recognition 
of actor role differences. Understanding how the viability 
of knowledge management depends upon symmetric 
incentives - peer knowledge production - and, in various 
ways, on appropriation of advantages from knowledge 
specificity has been the objective of this research. From 
observations of actor networks we know that stability 
may not easily be attained nor may it continue. In our 
analysis we have offered suggestions for research into the 
static as well as the dynamic aspects of distributed 
knowledge in actor-networks. In answering the research 
question of what the necessary conditions are for 
establishing and maintaining robustness of a distributed 
knowledge management model, 9 static and 5 dynamic 
aspects of robustness have been suggested. 
Like other network applications, the design of actor 
network distributed knowledge management system 
represents a real challenge to business. With outsourcing 
and technological complementarities in abundance the 
opportunities to take advantage of this model are prolific 
but challenging opportunities.  
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